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(55 C.2d 403; 10 CaJ.Rptr. 817. 359 P.2d 249)

[So F. No. 20379.

In Bank.

Feb. 16, 1961.]

CLARENCE O. GREENE, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR
COURT Ol~ THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN
FRANCISCO, Respondellt; RENEE S. GREENE, Real
Party in Interest.
[1] Motions-Orders-Vacation.-After a change of venue a court
of coordinate jurisdiction has power to vacate the orders of the
court of original vcnue, but that power is no greater than that
which the original court possessed.
[21 Divorce-Permanent Alimony-Modification in Separate Action.-Even if an order reducing alimony payments pendente
lite, in a modificatioll proceeding brought by the husband, was
erroneous, a motion to vacate such order was an improper
remedy.
[3] ld. - Temporary Alimony - Appeal.-An order granting or
denying temporary alimony is not merely a procedural ruling
made during the course of the action that the court may reconsider at any time before final judgment, but is directly
appealable as a final judgment independently of the main
action.
.
[4] ld. - Temporary Alimony - Mod.i1ication and Vacation of
Orders.-An order granting or denying temporary alimony may
be directly attacked in the trial court under Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 473, on the grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect or that it is void.
[5] Judgments-Correction-Judicial Error.-'-Although the trial
court can correct its own inadvertence or clerical error or set
aside a judgment or order obtained by extrinsic fraud, it can
correct judicial error only on motion for new trial or on
motion under Code Civ. Proc., § 663, to vacate the order or
judgment and enter a different one.
[6] Divorce-Permanent Alimony-Modification in Separate Action.-In a husband's action to reduce alimony payments provided for in a Nevada divorce decree, even if an order of a
superior court reducing such payments violated the full faith
and credit clause of the federal Constitution, it was not void;
and where another superior court, to which the cause was transferrell on the wife's motion for change of venue, vacated the
order, on lIlotion therefor, on the ground that it was "beyonll
[3] See Cal.Jur.£d, Divorce and Separation, § 190.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Motions, § 24; (2, 6] Divorce,
§ 216(8); [3] Divorce, § 195(2); [4] Divorce, § 191(4); (5] Judg.
ments, § 133; [7] Prohibition, § 16(1).
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the authority of the court," it exceeded its jurisdiction in so
doing.
[7] Prohibition-Grounds for Relief-Want of Jurisdiction.-AIthough prohibition will, not lie to review the validity of 11
completed judicial act, it is a proper remedy to prevent further
judicial action based on a void order.

PROCEEDING in prohibition to set aside the vacation of
an .order reducing monthly alimony payments pendente lite,
and to restrain the Superior Court of t~ City and County of
San Francisco from proceeding further in the cause. Peremptory writ granted.
Jack Miller, Kroloft, Brown, Belcher &; Smart and Duncan
Davidson for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Bert W. Hirschberg for Real Party in Interest.
TRAYNOR, J.-In February 1959 a Nevada court granted
Mrs. Renee S. Greene a' final decree of divorce from
Clarence O. Greene, petitioner herein. The decree incorporated
a'property settlement agreement of the parties, which provides
among other things for payments to Mrs. Greene of $600 a
month. In March of 1960 petitioner sought a modification
of the Nevada decree in the Superior Court of San Joaquin
County. He alleged that because of changed circumstances
he was unable to make the $600. monthly payments and moved
for an order pendente lite reducing the payments to $200 a
month. By a default minute order of April 28, 1960, the
motion to reduce the payments pendente lite was granted. On
June 16, 1960, a motion for change of venue by Mrs. Greene
was granted and the cause transferred to the Superior Court
for the City and County of San Francisco. On July 20, 1960,
Mrs. Greene moved in that court to vacate the order reducing
the payments pendente lite. The motion was granted on the
ground that the pendente lite order "was and is beyond the
authority of the Court." Petitioner sought a writ of prohibition or other appropriate writ to set aside the vacation of the
order reducing the monthly payments and to restrain the
[7] See Oal.Jur.lId, Prohibition, § 8 et seq.; Am.Jur., Prohibition,

ii 20,24.
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San Francisco court from proceeding further in the cause.
We issued an alternative writ of prohibition.
It is contended that an appeal from all order vacating
an appealable order is an adequnte rpmedy. (Colby v. Piel'cr,
15 Cal.App.2d 723,724-725 [59 P.2d 1046].) 'rhe absenl'e of
another adequate remedy, however, was dpit'J'mined when we
granted the alternative writ. (Cily & COI/Ilty of San Francisco v. Superior Cou,.t, 53 Ca1.2d 236, 243 [347 P.2d 294].)
[1] After a change of venue a court of coordinate jurisdiction has the power to vacate the orders of the court of
original venue. (Ross v. lIIllrplly, 113 Cal.App.2d 453, 455
[248 P.2d 122].) The power to vacate, however, is no gl'eater
than that which the original court possessed.
Mrs. Greene moved to vacate the order reducing payments
pendente lite 011 the ground that the San Joaquineourt had
no jurisdiction .to make such an order. She contends, not that
the court lacked personal or subject.matter jurisdiction, but
that the Nevada divorce decree was nonmodifiable in Nevada
and that the San Joaquin court excceded its jurisdiction in
reducing the payments thereunder in violation of the full
faith and credit and due process clauses of the United States
Constitution.
[2] We do not reach the question whether the reduction
in payments was erroneous. Even if it was, the motion to
vacate was an .improper remedy. [3] An order granting
or denying temporary alimony is not merely a procedural
ruling made during the course of the action that the court
may reconsider at any time before final jndgment (see City
of Los Anyeles v. Oliver, 102 CaI.App. 299, 325-326 [283 P.
298] ; De la Beckwith v. Superior Court, 146 Cal. 496, 499500 [80 P. 717] ; Harth v. Ten EycT..~, 16 Ca1.2d 829, 832-833
[108 P.2d 675]), but is directly appealable as a final judg·
ment independently of the main action. (Lincoln v. Superior
Court, 22 Ca1.2d 304, 310 [139 P .2d 13].) [ 4] It also
may be directly attacked in the trial court under section 473 of
the Code of Civil Procedure on the grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect or that it is void.
[5] Although the trial court can correct its own inadvertence
or clerieal error (Phillips v. Trusheim, 25 Ca1.2d 913, 916
[156 P.2d 25]), or set aside a judgment or order obtained by
extrinsic frawl (Mdhti1l'ness v. Supe-rim· Court, 196 Cal. 222,
230-232 [237 P. 42, 40 A.L.R. 1110]), it can correet judicial
error onl)' 011 a motion for new trial (Cat'ney v. Simmonds,
49 Ca1.2d 84, 90-91 [315 P.2d 305]) or on a motion under
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section 663 of the Code of Civil Procedure to vacate the order
or judgment and enter a different one.
[6] Even if the order of the San Joaquin court violated
the full faith and credit clause, it was not void (Treinies v.
Sunshine Min. Co., 308 U.S. 66, 78 [60 S.Ct. 44, 84 L.Ed. 85]),
and since the San Francisco court did not vacate that order
pursuant to any of its other powers stated above, it exceeded
its jurisdiction in so doing. (City of San Diego v. Superi01'
Court, 36 Ca1.2d 483,486-487 [224 P.2d 685] ; Barlow v. Oity
Council of the City of Englewood, 32 Ca1.2d 688, 692·693 [197
P.2d 721] ; Bowman v. Bowman, 29 ·Ca1.2d 808, 814-815 [178
P.2d 751, 170 A.L.R. 246] ; Phillips v. Trusheim, 25 Ca1.2d
!J13, 916 [156 P.2d 25] ; BastaFa.n v. Brown, 19 Ca1.2d 209,
214 [120 P.2d 9]; Holtum v. Grief, 144 Cal. 521, 524-525
[78 P. 11].) [7] Although prohibition will not lie to review
the validity of a complete judicial act, it is a proper remedy
to prevent further judicial action based upon a void order.
(City of San Diego v. Superior Court, 36 Ca1.2d 483, 487-488
[224 P.2d 685].)
Let the peremptory writ issue prohibiting respondent court
from giving effect to its order setting aside the order of the
Superior Court of San Joaquin County.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., White, J.,
and Dooling, J., concurred.
The petition of the real party in interest for a rehearing
was denied March 15, 1961.
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